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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Refusing To Apply Controlling Idaho Precedent 
Introduction 
The district court held that allowing the state to rely on implied consent 
would "bypass the U.S. Supreme Court's announcement that, absent exigent 
circumstances, the Fourth Amendment mandates that an officer obtain a warrant 
prior to conducting a blood draw." (R., p. 125.) The state contends on appeal 
that the district court erred by effectively eliminating all exceptions to the warrant 
requirement except exigency, and that implied consent remains a viable 
exception to the warrant requirement. (Appellant's brief, pp. 3-6.) 
Halseth makes no attempt to directly defend the district court's conclusion 
that the implied consent exception is no longer viable. Instead, he contends that 
the implied consent exception did not justify the blood draw under the facts of 
this case (Respondent's brief, pp. 11-16), and that to the extent Idaho law 
provides that implied consent may not be revoked it is unconstitutional 
(Respondent's brief, pp. 16-19). Review shows that neither of these arguments 
justify affirming the district court's ruling. 
B. This Case Is Controlled By Diaz, Which Is On Point 
In this case the evidence indicates Halseth, more than an hour before his 
blood was actually taken, verbally stated that he refused to submit to a blood 
draw. (Exhibits, p. 5. 1) There is no evidence Halseth physically resisted the 
1 Citations to the Exhibits are to the file "Dennus Halseth Exhibit's.pdf." 
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blood draw. (Id.) In State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 301, 160 P.3d 739, 740 
(2007), "Diaz did not physically resist transportation to the hospital or the taking 
of his blood, but he continued to protest the [warrantless] blood draw." The court 
acknowledged Diaz's argument that there was no exigency that would justify the 
warrantless blood draw, but that was "not the lone applicable exception here; 
consent is also a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement." ~ at 
302, 160 P.3d at 741. "Because Diaz had already given his implied consent to 
evidentiary testing by driving on an Idaho road, he also gave his consent to a 
blood draw. Without addressing whether exigency also justified the blood draw, 
we hold that the seizure of Diaz's blood fell within a well-recognized exception to 
the warrant requirement." ~ at 303, 160 P.3d at 742. Because the procedure 
was "done in a medically acceptable manner and without unreasonable force" 
the police acted reasonably "[u]nder the totality of the circumstances." ~ Even 
assuming that Halseth's statement, made more than an hour prior to the blood 
draw, was a refusal, Diaz is factually and legally indistinguishable from this case. 
C. Halseth's Argument That Oiaz Has Been Effectively Overruled Is Without 
Merit 
Halseth argues that because the Supreme Court of the United States 
rejected a per se test for exigent circumstances and applied a totality of the 
circumstances test, Diaz is no longer valid. (Respondent's brief, pp. 11-13.) 
This argument fails on several levels, the most obvious being that the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Diaz applied the totality of the circumstances test. ~ at 303, 
160 P .3d at 742. Those circumstances included that the facts known to the 
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officer provided probable cause to believe Diaz was under the influence, that 
Diaz drove on an Idaho road, and that the officers did not employ unreasonable 
force. 1st at 302-03,160 P.3d at 741-42. It is actually Halseth who advocates 
for a bright line rule: that verbal revocation of consent always renders the blood 
draw unreasonable. 
In support of his argument Halseth also cites State v. Butler, 302 P.3d 609 
(Ariz. 2013). (Respondent's brief, pp. 15-16.) In that case the Supreme Court of 
Arizona noted that its state implied consent law required the officer "to ask the 
arrestee to submit to the test, and the arrestee may then refuse by declining to 
expressly agree to take the test." Butler, 302 P.3d at 613. The officer complied 
with that requirement, but the express consent he ultimately obtained was 
deemed involuntary under the facts of that case. 1st at 613-14. 
Unlike Arizona law, where consent is obtained at the time of the test, 
under Idaho law implied consent is obtained at the time of driving. Diaz, 144 
Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742 (Diaz gave consent "by driving on an Idaho road"). 
There is no evidence whatsoever that any police officer or other agent of the 
state compelled Halseth to give his implied consent by driving on an Idaho road 
while under the influence. The totality of the circumstances shows an entirely 
voluntary consent. 
Diaz is completely consistent with Fourth Amendment standards. Halseth 
voluntarily gave his implied consent by driving. He was not legally entitled to 
withdraw it. The totality of the circumstances included that police had probable 
cause to believe Halseth had been driving on an Idaho road while under the 
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influence of alcohol and did not employ force, much less unreasonable force, to 
effectuate the draw. There is nothing constitutionally unreasonable about the 
police action in obtaining evidence of Halseth's guilt of felony DUL 
D. Halseth's Argument That Oiaz Should Be Overruled Is Without Merit 
Finally, Halseth argues Diaz and other cases upholding the implied 
consent exception should be overruled, claiming that they are inconsistent with 
Constitutional standards that consent be voluntary and that the government 
cannot inhibit the ability to withdraw that consent. (Respondent's brief, pp. 16-
19.) Controlling precedent should be followed "unless it is manifestly wrong, 
unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is 
necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued 
injustice." State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002); State v. 
Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting Houghland 
Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)). Halseth's 
argument does not withstand scrutiny because implied consent laws that, by 
definition, punish refusal to consent to evidentiary testing have been repeatedly 
upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States. Halseth has failed to show 
that Diaz, or other Idaho cases allowing implied consent, is inconsistent with 
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has long upheld the viability of 
implied consent statutes. In Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112 (1983), the 
Court upheld Illinois's implied consent license suspension procedures against a 
due process challenge. It is unimaginable that the state could, consistently with 
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due process, suspend someone's license for exercising a Constitutional right to 
refuse evidence testing. In North Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), the 
Supreme Court held that evidence of the defendant's refusal to take a blood test 
under the implied consent laws was admissible evidence of his guilt. Again, the 
ability to use evidence of the defendant's refusal to submit to testing as evidence 
of guilt is entirely inconsistent with Halseth's claim of a constitutional right to 
refuse. In fact, as part of its reasoning the Court specifically stated that "a 
person suspected of drunk driving has no constitutional right to refuse to take a 
blood-alcohol test." lsi at 560 n.1 O. 
If Halseth's argument were true, it would necessarily render all evidence 
gathered by blood testing pursuant to implied consent inadmissible, for in al/ 
cases the officer has necessarily threatened the suspect with harsh 
consequences for his refusal that would, under Halseth's analysis, taint any 
evidence obtained. The Supreme Court's endorsement of implied consent laws 
over decades, up to and including Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1565-66 
(2013), is at least an implicit rejection of Halseth's argument that such laws are 
unconstitutional because they burden the right to freely grant or withhold 
consent. 
The district court declared implied consent a dead letter on the basis that 
the Supreme Court of the United States had declined to hold that exigent 
circumstances was a per se test. Halseth declines to adopt that reasoning, but 
his argument goes as far; contending that the government may not impede a 
suspected drunk driver's constitutional right to voluntarily choose whether to 
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submit to evidentiary testing. He has failed, however, to show that abundant and 
long-standing precedent from both this Court and the Supreme Court of the 
United States is wrong. 
The district court declined to follow binding precedent of the Idaho 
Supreme Court when it suppressed evidence of Halseth's BAC. Its reasons for 
doing so were erroneous and Halseth has failed to show alternative grounds for 
affirming. Therefore the district court erred and the error must be corrected. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
order of suppression and remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this 28th day of February, 
Deputy Attorney Gen 
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